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Abstract 
Much of the literature on industry evolution has found firm dynamics to be an important 
source of sector-level productivity growth. In this paper, we ask whether the delineation 
of entry and exit firms matters in assessing the impact of firm turnover. Using detailed 
firm level data from Vietnam, it emerges that efficiency differences between sector 
switchers and exit/entry firms exist. Distinguishing between switchers and firm 
entry/exit is crucial for understanding the contribution of firm turnover to overall 
productivity growth. Moreover, we uncover distinct and illuminating firm and sector-
level determinants of firm exit and switching, which need to be carefully considered in 
the search for effective policy. 
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1. Introduction 
Productivity is an important indicator of manufacturing sector performance. Many 
studies have documented the link between productivity growth and other indicators of 
success, including employment creation, export status and technology adoption. Tybout 
(2000) reviews literature relevant to developing country contexts, and focus has 
regularly been on the relationship between firm turnover and productivity. Firm level 
data have been used extensively, and many studies suggest that entry firms are more 
efficient than enterprises exiting a particular sector. Accordingly, it is widely agreed that 
firm turnover is an important source of sector-level productivity growth.1 No attention 
has however so far been paid to the potential effect, differences in the delineation of 
entrants and exits may have on efficiency outcomes. For example, Aw et al. (2001) pool 
firms, which change legal ownership form, location or sector, with respectively firms 
that close down production altogether (“real” exits) and newly established firms (“real” 
entrants).  
Our prior is along the lines of Bernard et al. (2006a) that while pooling is common it is 
also problematic. Efficiency levels are likely to vary among the different kinds of 
exiting and entering firms, and this suggests that the overall contribution to productivity 
growth from firm turnover is a composite. Similarly, there are several reasons to believe 
that the factors which affect sector switching (i.e. a firm’s choice to change sector) may 
be very different from those, which influence “real” exits and entrants.  To illustrate, 
efficient rural firms may tend to move towards urban growth centers to benefit from 
agglomeration advantages (Henderson, 1986). Pooling these firms with other exits can 
be seriously misleading if the analyst is interested in understanding the determinants of 
firms that close down altogether or vice-versa. Well established sector switchers may 
also have better management experience than new entrants as noted in the overview by 
Bartelsman and Doms (2000); and switchers may have better knowledge of the general 
business environment and the market conditions facing the firm. All this suggests that 
(i) potential aggregation errors should not be ignored, and (ii) sorting out the 
characteristics of different groups of firms is likely to add to our understanding of firm 
dynamics and the contribution of firm turnover to productivity growth. 
                                                 
1 See for example Aw et al. (2001), Bartelsman and Doms (2000) and Tybout (2000). 
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In this paper we explore (i) efficiency levels among different types of manufacturing 
firms in Vietnam, and (ii) the firm and sector level factors which determine firm exit 
and switching decisions. Vietnam represents an illustrative case of economies in 
transition for exploring these issues. Wide ranging reforms to enterprise, commercial 
and investment laws have been carried out in recent years; and economic growth in the 
last five years has been impressive. The industrial sector has played a key role in this 
process,2 and industrial value added is set to grow at around 10 percent per year from 
2006 to 2010 according to the Socio-Economic Development Plan (MPI, 2006). At the 
same time, accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in January 2007 presents 
a new set of challenges to the sector.  
The industry dynamics literature has recently evolved to consider the impact of trade 
liberalisation and other policy reforms on productivity, primarily through firm exit and 
entry. Melitz (2003), Pavcnik (2002) and Eslava et al. (2004) are all relevant in pointing 
to a variety of mechanisms through which trade liberalisation can impact positively on 
growth. It transpires as well that these effects will depend on the ability and willingness 
of firms to reallocate activity across sub-sectors and whether or not this reallocation is 
productivity enhancing. We argue that (i) firm turnover and sector switching are likely 
to play an important role in determining the overall productivity performance of the 
manufacturing sector both now and in the future, and (ii) in order to inform policy we 
need to understand whether and how manufacturing sub-sectors differ in terms of the 
factors that impact on firm decisions to reallocate resources.  
Our data come from the Vietnamese Census of Production for 2001-2004 provided by 
the General Statistics Office (GSO), and we analyse firm switching and exit in the run 
up to WTO accession in two steps. In the first step, stochastic frontier production 
functions are estimated for sub-sectors of the manufacturing sector and relative 
efficiency measures are calculated for each firm for the period 2001 to 2004. This firm-
specific efficiency measure allows us to establish the extent to which the efficiency of 
incumbent firms differs from that of new entrants, real exits and switching firms that 
reallocate resources across sectors. In the second analytical step, we formally explore 
                                                 
2 Between 2001 and 2005 growth in GDP averaged around 7 percent annually with growth in 2005 
reaching 8.1 percent.  The industry share of GDP reached 41 per cent in 2005, with growth in the sector 
driven by private sector expansion. 
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the relationship between efficiency and firm exit and sector switching. Explanatory 
variables include firm specific factors such as age, size and form of legal ownership 
along with sector-level indicators including different concentration ratios, sector 
efficiency levels and rates of protection. We find clear evidence that conventional 
wisdom needs to be revised. The positive productivity effect of firm turnover seems – at 
least in the case of Vietnam – to be driven by sector switchers. Moreover, distinct 
differences in the firm and sector-level determinants of firm switching and real exiting 
emerge.  
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we rely on existing studies to identify 
potential determinants of sector switching and exit, while Section 3 presents the 
empirical approach. Section 4 describes the data, and empirical results are put forward 
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Explanatory variables  
Bernard et al. (2006a) suggest that product switching is important for sector dynamics, 
and highlight (using U.S. manufacturing data) that “product/industry/sector switching is 
frequent, widespread and influential in determining both firm and aggregate 
outcomes”.3 We ask whether this is also the case in Vietnam in what follows, and in 
addition enquire whether differences exist between the decision to switch sectors, on the 
one hand, and exit and entry decisions, on the other. Based on the literature, we propose 
a number of firm and sector specific determinants of firm exit and sector switching 
decisions. Considering firm specific explanations first, Bernard et al. (2006a) argue that 
an extended version of standard sector dynamics models can be relied on in analysing 
sector switching.  
                                                 
3 Bernard et al. (2006a) refer to 2-digit ISIC categories as sectors, 4-digit ISIC categories as industries 
and 5-digit ISIC as products or goods. We follow their definition and focus on sector switching (2-digit 
level), which may be considered a more conservative measure of switching behaviour. While the data 
allow for analysis at the 4-digit level, which would significantly increase the number of switchers (at the 
industry level), we have chosen to select the 2-digit ISIC level to make our study comparable to the wide 
range of firm dynamic studies that use this level of disaggregation. 
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The seminal work of Jovanovic (1982) considers a passive learning model in which 
information is gathered at no cost. Firms entering a new product market do not know 
their exact cost structure and assuming that firms differ with regard to efficiency, they 
incur different costs when producing the same levels of output. Entrants do not know 
their exact abilities (productivity) so their performance is unknown, and each participant 
has to go through a learning process, accumulating information from actual market 
experience. Gradually firms may discover whether their abilities meet prior 
expectations, and if not they exit. Consequently, efficient firms survive and experience 
growth, whereas over-optimistic firms eventually switch sector or close down. The 
longer a firm has been in a sector the more knowledge it has about its own abilities, 
suggesting that the probability that a firm switches is negatively related to firm age. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize that the probability of a firm switching sector is 
decreasing in firm level efficiency and age as well as size, noting that the motivation for 
including size is well established in the firm dynamics literature 
Ownership structure may also influence sector switching, even when firm specific 
efficiency, age and size are controlled for.4 Wen et al. (2002) study the reforms of state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) in China and note that responsibility for many production 
decisions have gradually been decentralized to individual firms. However, although the 
importance of central planning departments and committees has been shrinking, 
decisions about the industries in which SOEs should engage continue to be made at 
central level. This political hierarchy in SOE management structure is likely to limit 
inter-sector dynamics, so we expect SOEs to switch sector less frequently. At the same 
time, the ongoing reform/privatization process in Vietnam appears to close down 
relatively many SOEs. We therefore hypothesize that there is a positive association 
between state ownership and firm closure in the exit specification at firm level.  
Foreign owned enterprises, or enterprises with some foreign participation, are also 
expected to be more “locked into” specific sectors due to the legal constraints. Until 
                                                 
4 Choices are involved in classifying firms by ownership type as discussed in the data appendix, and there 
are “grey” areas  involved in distinguishing between state and foreign owned firms. This is however 
unavoidable in the type of analysis put forward here. As regards mergers these are very limited in number 
as this process is just starting in Vietnam. As such merging is of no quantitative significance to our 
results. In most mergers and acquisitions firms kept at least one business registration licence and one tax 
code registration. This means that one firm stays in our data as an incumbent and the rest of the merger 
firms exit. Note also that mergers and acquisitions are often followed by sector switch. 
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recently, foreign and domestic investors were governed by two separate laws: the Law 
of Foreign Investment and the Law of Domestic Investment.5 Although the 1999 
Enterprise Law aimed at leveling the playing field for domestic and multinational firms, 
foreign investment has generally been directed towards special sub-sectors selected by 
the Vietnamese authorities.6 Capital shortage and technological spillover arguments 
motivated the introduction of preferential treatment of foreign-owned firms in the late 
1990s, and following the Chinese model, special economic zones were created. While 
we expect foreign enterprises to be less prone to switch sector, these special 
arrangements make it less likely for foreign firms to shut down. 
Bernard et al. (2006a) propose that aside from firm-specific characteristics, firm exit 
and sector switching are also driven by sector-specific characteristics which are 
common to all firms in a given sector. Examples include sudden shifts in consumer 
preferences affecting demand, supply shocks driven by changes in sector structure due 
to policy reform, new or refined production technologies and trade liberalization. All of 
these events affect product profitability and are thus likely to affect firm allocation 
decisions. We consider five such sector specific “push” and “pull” factors in what 
follows.  
First, we expect that the dominance of state enterprises (SR) (state owned enterprise 
share of total sector output) plays a role in affecting exit and switching decisions. 
Preferential treatment of SOEs makes it difficult for non-state enterprises to compete 
and may force more efficient non-state firms to exit (or decide not to enter highly SOE 
concentrated industries). At the same time, during the ongoing transition from a 
planning to a market economy the SOE share of material inputs bought at market 
conditions may, as suggested by Jefferson and Rawski (1994) in the case of China, 
increase the attractiveness of highly SOE concentrated industries for smaller (private) 
                                                 
5 A new Investment Law came into effect in July 2006 (CIEM, 2006). This law aims at equalizing 
opportunities for domestic and foreign investors. However, as outlined in Freshfields Bruchhaus Deringer 
(2006), a truly common framework has not yet been achieved in all areas. 
6 Thuyet (1995) documents the Vietnamese government’s approach to foreign investment, which includes 
a list of five broad sub-sectors where foreign investors are encouraged to conduct business. The five 
broad sub-sectors are: (1) large scale industries (with a focus on export-oriented and import substitution 
industries), (2) high-technology industries, (3) labour intensive industries using raw materials and natural 
resources available in Vietnam, (4) construction of infrastructure, and (5) foreign-exchange-earning 
service industries. 
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enterprises acting as producers of intermediates for SOEs. The net effect on firm 
dynamics is consequently an interesting empirical issue. 
Second, similar arguments apply when considering the dominance of foreign enterprises 
(FR) (foreign enterprise share of total sector output). Aitkin and Harrison (1999) 
emphasize that preferential treatment of foreign owned firms may distort competition 
and force (equally efficient) domestically owned counterparts out.7 However, one 
reason why governments grant special treatment is to promote technology transfer, and 
new products and/or production processes introduced by foreign firms may indeed spill-
over to domestic firms. Diffusion can also occur through labour turnover, so a high 
presence of foreign enterprises in a particular sector may attract domestic firms. In sum, 
whether FR is positively or negatively related to sector switching and firm exit depends 
on which of the above effects dominate (competition versus technology transfer).8 
Third, the sector concentration ratio (CR), measured as the ratio of the accumulated 
revenue of the four largest firms to total revenue in the sector, is often referred to as a 
proxy for the degree of competition. Siegfried and Evans (1994) document that a high 
CR may strengthen collusion efforts among incumbent firms and increase the likelihood 
of behaviour to prevent entry and maintain higher expected profits. In parallel, 
Audretsch (1991) has shown that a high CR will help the survival rates of new entrants 
in the short run. On balance we expect that a high CR reduces firm incentives to move 
out of (i.e. exit or switch out of) a given sector. 
Fourth, the average sector efficiency score (EFF) (calculated from the individual firm 
efficiency levels) is another indicator of sector level competition. However, as 
compared to the CR indicator, the underlying mechanism through which EFF influences 
firm exit and sector switching decisions is somewhat different. A high EFF serves as a 
push factor, increasing the probability of exit and sector switching for under-average 
firm performers to sectors with lower average efficiency levels, where they may be 
better able to compete. 
                                                 
7 Evidence for Venezuela suggests that once sector specific effects are controlled for, domestic firms 
perform worse as foreign dominance in a sector increases (Tybout, 2000). 
8 Foreign enterprises may also create a basis for domestically owned firms to produce intermediate inputs 
as in the case of SOEs. Therefore, inter-industry spillovers from FDI may occur.  Javorcik (2004) finds 
evidence of backward linkages for Lithuania while Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2004) find similar 
evidence for Venezuela, Brazil and Chile.  
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Finally, the effective rate of protection (ERP) measures the proportionate increase in per 
unit value added of a sector due to the complete system of tariffs. More specifically, it 
takes into account the protection on output and the cost-raising effects of protection on 
inputs. Our hypothesis is that firm turnover is lower in highly protected sectors, 
although Arthukorola (2006) notes that much of the ERP levels and changes reflect 
levels and increases in import duties on intermediates rather than on final goods. 
 
3. Empirical approach 
3.1 Estimating efficiency and TFP 
A broad range of methodologies have been developed for the purpose of estimating 
productivity,9 and choices have to be made in identifying the appropriate approach. 
Measurement error in inputs is common in most firm level data, particularly for 
developing countries. Parametric methods that calculate productivity from a 
stochastically estimated production function will be less vulnerable to measurement 
errors than their non-parametric alternatives.10 While this will come at the cost of a less 
flexible technology specification, appropriate testing procedures can be used to ensure 
that the production function is correctly specified. An additional issue is the 
simultaneity of productivity and firm input choices. When firms choose inputs they may 
be aware of their own productivity but the econometrician is not. As such inputs will be 
correlated with the unobserved error term which captures productivity. One way of 
dealing with this is the stochastic frontier approach.11 This involves the calculation of 
productivity from a parametrically estimated production function which imposes 
assumptions on the distribution of the unobserved productivity component to separate 
productivity from the deterministic part of the production function and the statistical 
noise term. 
                                                 
9 See Van Biesebroeck (2003) for an overview of the various methodologies that have been proposed in 
the literature. 
10 For example, index number approaches or data envelopment analysis (DEA). 
11 See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) for an overview. Alternative approaches, not used here due to data 
limitations, are instrumental variables estimation, for example the approach developed by Blundell and 
Bond (1998; 2000) and semi-parametric estimation, for example the approaches developed by Olley and 
Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). 
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The production technology in this paper is therefore defined separately for each sub-
sector using a stochastic production frontier which expresses output as a function of 
inputs, technical inefficiencies capturing the degree to which firms produce below the 
optimal level of production and a random error component (Pitt and Lee, 1981). 
( ); ti iv ut ti iy f x eβ −=  
1,2,...., ji n= ; 1,2,...t T=         (1) 
where tiy  represents the output of the i th firm in a particular sub-sector in time period 
t , tix  the vector of inputs into the production process, β  the vector of parameters of the 
production function, and tiv  statistical noise and other random external events 
influencing the production process.12 The technical efficiency of the i th firm relative to 
the stochastic frontier for its group is given by the ratio of observed output to the 
corresponding stochastic frontier output: 
( ); iti
t
ui
i vt
i
yTE e
f x eβ
−= =         (2) 
As such, iu  are the firm specific inefficiency effects for a particular sector, and we 
assume tiv  and iu  are independent. If 0iu = , the firm is efficient and operates on the 
group specific production frontier. If 0iu > , there are inefficiencies and the firm 
operates beneath the best-practice frontier for the sub-sector.  
The stochastic production function for each sub-sector can be estimated by specifying 
an appropriate functional form for each model. We use a translog production function 
which incorporates controls for exogenous fixed time effects tω , for example, due to 
technological change or policy changes which affect all firms equally. 
1 1 1
1ln ln ln ln
2
K K L
t t t t t t
i k ik kl ik il i i
k k l
y x x x v uα β β ω
= = =
= + + + + −∑ ∑∑    (3) 
                                                 
12 tijv  is assumed to be iid ( )20, vjN σ . 
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The short panel available to us prevents time varying components in the production 
function and the inefficiency component from being separately identified (Greene, 
2005). Inefficiency effects are therefore assumed not to vary over the course of the four 
years. Average efficiency levels in an industry can only change from year to year if 
firms exit or enter the sector. The inefficiency effects are assumed to be distributed as a 
truncated normal distribution with mean μ . Where μ  is found to be insignificant a half 
normal distribution is assumed. 
The estimated parameters of the production function and the efficiency estimates are 
used to construct a generalised Malmquist index of total factor productivity growth for 
each sector which allows us to determine which sectors are driving productivity growth 
in the manufacturing sector as a whole (see Coelli et al. (2005) for an overview of this 
approach).  The purpose of constructing a productivity index is to measure output 
growth that is net of input growth, that is, output growth due to efficiency change, 
technical change or the contribution of scale economies.  Relative technical efficiency 
( itRTE , calculated as the ratio of a firms technical efficiency score relative to the 
maximum in time t) can be interpreted in the same way as a distance function and as 
such the change from one period to the next can be used to calculate an efficiency 
change index comparable to that associated with the Malmquist index: 
1−= ititit RTERTETEI         (4) 
The Malmquist index measures technical change as the geometric mean of the shift in 
technology between two adjacent time periods evaluated at the input values associated 
with each time period, respectively. Since non-neutral technical change is not 
considered in our model, and so technological change is unaffected by year on year 
changes in input values, a corresponding technical change index can be constructed 
using the estimated parameters on the fixed time effects of the sector specific 
production functions (equation (5)). 
[ ]1exp −−= tttTCI δδ         (5) 
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Productivity changes due to changes in scale change are incorporated using Orea’s 
(2002) generalisation of the Malmquist index as the contribution to output of the change 
in the input mix from one year to the next (equation (6)). 
( ) ( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= ∑
=
−
K
k
iktiktiikit xxSFSCI
1
1ln5.0exp ε       (6) 
where ( ) iiiSF εε 1−= , ∑
=
=
K
k
iki
1
εε  and 
it
it
ik x
y
ln
ln
∂
∂=ε .  The Malmquist index is 
computed as the product of each of these components. 
The remainder of our analysis focuses specifically on relative efficiency measures.  We 
hypothesize that a firm’s position relative to other firms in their sub-sector will 
influence their decision to either remain as incumbent in the sub-sector, switch or exit. 
Firms are likely to remain if they perform well and exit/switch either if they under-
perform relative to the average or find that potential profits elsewhere are attractive. The 
sub-sector they switch to may be determined by the average performance of firms in 
other sectors. Thus, the following three components of efficiency will influence a firm’s 
reallocation decision: (i) the average efficiency level of the sub-sector they are in, (ii) 
how well they are doing relative to other firms in that sub-sector, and (iii) the average 
efficiency level of the sub-sector they intend (or are considering) moving to.13 
 
3.2 Modelling the reallocation decision 
We estimate random effects probit models of the sector switching and exit decisions. A 
random effects approach is chosen given that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
using fixed effects is complicated by the incidental parameters problem (Lancaster, 
2000).14 In order to overcome problems associated with measuring productivity in 
                                                 
13 We recognize that the “closeness” of sectors from where a firm switches out of and into is also likely to 
impact. There is no simple way given our data to account for this dimension, which is left for future 
research. The same goes for trying to measure the cost of switching more generally, which is conceptually 
comparable to the transactions costs, which are well known from for example the economic analysis of 
agricultural supply response (Heltberg and Tarp, 2002). 
14 The binary nature of the dependent variable leads to the incidental parameters problem which prevents 
the unobserved heterogeneity from being treated as a fixed effect (Neyman and Scott, 1948). As an 
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multi-product firms, we consider single-product firms only.15 The underlying latent 
model for the sector switching decision is presented in equation (4), where ijts  
represents the sector switching decision for firm i, in sector j, at time t. Vectors 1ijtx −  and 
1jtz −  are one-period lagged firm specific and sector specific explanatory variables, 
respectively, and the unobserved heterogeneity is treated as a random effect, iυ . 
0 1 1 1 2* ' 'ijt ijt jt i ijts x z eα α α υ− −= + + + +       (4) 
where 0ijts =  if * 0ijts ≤  and 1ijts =  if * 0ijts >  and 0α , 1α  and 2α  are parameters to be 
estimated. 
 
4. Data 
Data come from the Vietnamese Census of Production for 2001-2004 provided by the 
General Statistics Office of Vietnam GSO (2005).16 The dataset includes all registered 
enterprises at the end of each year, and we consider 19  two-digit level sub-groups of 
the manufacturing sector (detailed in Table 1). The total sample consists of 61,510 
observations on 23,916 manufacturing firms. We exclude, as alluded to above, firms 
                                                                                                                                               
alternative, the unobserved effects can be treated as a random effect. It should be noted, however, that 
consistent estimation of the random effects model by maximum likelihood requires the assumption that 
the errors are independent of other regressors in the model. Since much of the focus here is on sector 
specific explanatory factors, correlations between the regressors and the individual effects are of less 
concern. 
15 Bernard et al. (2006b) examine the implications of unobserved product-mix variation and product 
switching for the measurement of firm and sector level productivity. They demonstrate that production-
technology differences across products and product-choice variation across firms interact to bias standard 
production function based estimates of firm productivity. When firms endogenously choose between 
products with heterogeneous techniques, standard measures of TFP will be systematically biased (Bernard 
et al., 2006b). Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) control for several sources of 
measurement error, but they do not eliminate the bias in productivity measures due to endogenous product 
choice. We correct for this by sorting firms into groups that make a single product, and measure 
productivity across firms making the same product. We also note that multi-product firms may have 
different switching behaviour than single product firms. 
16 A more thorough description of the data is given in the Appendix and in GSO (2005). 
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that produce products from different sub-sectors, so our sample is restricted to 44,712 
observations on 20,521 manufacturing firms.17 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
For the production function analysis, the output variable is defined as the gross value 
added of the firm deflated by the industrial output price index relevant to the two-digit 
sub-sector. It is constructed by adding total labour costs to gross profit. Inputs include 
(i) labour, measured as the total number of persons employed at the end of the year in 
question,18 and (ii) capital, measured as the total assets of the firm at the end of the year 
deflated by a capital price series. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3 outlines the number of sector switchers, exits and entrants in the sample. Sector 
switching “OUT” counts the number of firms, which change main production sector 
(two-digit ISIC) in the subsequent year. Similarly, sector switching “IN” documents the 
number of firms that have just entered a new sector as compared to the previous year. 
We are interested in comparing firms that fall into the sector switching “OUT” and “IN” 
categories to “real” exits and new entrants, respectively. Around 4.6 percent (on 
average) switch out of a given sector each year. This is somewhat below the average 
number of exit firms (8-10 percent on average exit each year, depending on the sample 
considered). Even larger differences exist between sector switchers “IN” and new 
entrants, mainly due to the nature of the data (registered firms).19  
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                 
17 As a robustness check we also consider the sub-sample of firms which remain in the sample for the 
entire period, thus eliminating the impact of exit/entry decisions. 
18 All firms with four employees or less are excluded from the analysis, representing around 20 percent of 
the total sample in all years.  
19 Given that only registered firms under the enterprise law are covered makes analysing several aspects 
of firm entry problematic. Firms entering in 2002, 2003 or 2004 may have existed for several years before 
registering, and therefore do not constitute entrants in strict terms. Registration involves several benefits 
to firms (easier access to credit etc.). However it also makes firms more visible to government authorities 
(and especially tax collectors). It is therefore uncertain during which stage in their life-cycle a firm 
decides or is forced to register. Moreover, the post 2001 surveys did not collect information on 
establishment year. Given the nature of the data we therefore focus most of our attention on efficiency 
differentials between incumbents, exits and sector switching firms in what follows. 
 14
Table 4 provides sector details on sector switching firms, focusing on the 1,076 firms 
that switch “OUT” of a particular sector.20 Each row illustrates the number of firms that 
switch “OUT” of a particular sector and categorizes these firms across the columns by 
the sector they switch “IN” to. For example, 10 firms leaving production within 
“Fabricated metal products” (ISIC 28) change to “Repairing of other transport 
equipment” (ISIC 35), whereas nine firms move in the opposite direction. The sectors 
that experience the greatest proportion of outward switchers are “Assembling/repairing 
of motor vehicles” (ISIC 34 – 12.7%), “Furniture” (ISIC 36 – 10.3%) and “Medical and 
optical instruments” (ISIC 33 – 8.9%). These sectors are also the ones that sector 
switchers most frequently switch into suggesting a positive correlation between the 
number of firm switchers entering and exiting specific sectors. This is consistent with 
much of the literature on firm dynamics which finds a positive correlation between exit 
and entry rates at the sector level.21 Over 33 percent of the firms leaving a particular 
sector switch to the tertiary/service sector. This is particularly so for “Food processing” 
(ISIC 15), where 76.1 percent of exiting firms switch to the service sector. The table 
also documents exit rates by sector. As a percentage of the total number of firms in the 
sector, most firms exit “Non-metallic mineral products” (ISIC 26 – 9.4 percent) and 
“Basic metals” (ISIC 27 – 8.9 percent). 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 5 reports summary statistics for each of the sector specific variables considered in 
the exit and sector switching specifications. Firstly, the variation in the SOE 
concentration ratio (SR) across sectors is quite high, ranging from 76.2 percent in 
“Publishing and printing” (ISIC 22) to 6.0 percent in manufacture of “Furniture” (ISIC 
                                                 
20 The observations used in the construction of Table 4 correspond to the total in Table 3 for sector 
switching “OUT” with consistent information on firm age (establishment year). The 1,076 sector 
switching observations occur among 949 firms. Some 829 firms switch sector only once, whereas 113 and 
seven firms switch main production two and three times respectively. A similar table for firms in the “IN” 
category has been excluded due to space considerations. Results are available on request. The same table 
for the total of 1,431 switching “OUT” firms is presented in the Appendix (Table A). Entry rates by sector 
are also included.  
21 See for example Disney et al. (2003) who find a high level of correlation between entry and exit rates 
within UK manufacturing industries and Roberts and Tybout (1996) who find similar evidence in a 
developing country context. 
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36).22 There is also a relatively high level of variation across sectors in the extent of 
foreign participation (FR) ranging from 3.1 percent in “Publishing and printing” (ISIC 
22) where there is high degree of state involvement to 61.6 percent in “Radio and 
communication equipment” (ISIC 32). The sector concentration ratio (CR) shows very 
high concentration ratios in “Basic Metals” (ISIC 27 - 49.2 percent) and in “Medical 
and optical instruments” (ISIC 33 - 50.3 percent). Fourthly, the average sector 
efficiency score is particularly high for the “”Fabricated metal products” (ISIC 28), 
“Furniture” (ISIC 36) and “Wearing apparel” (ISIC 18), closely followed by sectors 
such as “Wood and wood products” (ISIC 20), “Paper and paper products” (ISIC 21), 
“Rubber and rubber products” (ISIC 25), “Machinery and equipment” (ISC 29) and 
“Radio and communication equipment” (ISIC 32). At the other end, we find “Repairing 
of other transport equipment” (ISIC 35), “Electrical machinery and appliances” (ISIC 
31) and “Medical and optical instruments” (ISIC 33). Finally, summary statistics for the 
effective rate of protection (ERP) reveal that “Food processing” (ISIC 15), “Textiles” 
(ISIC 17), “Wearing Apparel” (ISIC 18) and “Assembling/repairing of motor vehicles” 
(ISIC 34) were highly protected sectors in the period under study. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Production function estimation and efficiency 
Our model is estimated separately for each two-digit sub-sector described in Table 1 
using Frontier Version 4.1 (Coelli, 1996). As discussed in Section 3, parametric 
approaches to production function estimation require restrictions on the technology 
underlying the production process. A series of specification tests is performed to ensure 
an appropriate functional form for each production function (see Table B in the 
Appendix). While the model should be as flexible as possible, this should not come at 
the price of theoretical inconsistency. Tests for the theoretical consistency of the 
                                                 
22 Note that not all firms labelled as state owned firms have 100 percent state ownership. For example, for 
“Publishing and printing” (ISIC 22) 76.2 percent of output in the sector is produced by a firm with at least 
50 percent state ownership.  
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estimated stochastic production functions are presented in Table C of the Appendix. If 
the estimated parameters violate the assumptions of monotonicity and quasi-concavity, 
elasticities and technical efficiency estimates can be misleading as discussed by Sauer et 
al. (2006). This is particularly the case in the present application where the primary 
purpose of the model is to produce accurate measures of firm level productivity.  
It is reassuring here that the partial derivatives of the production functions are of the 
appropriate sign at the sample mean in all cases with only few violations of the 
monotonicity assumption throughout the sample as a whole. Curvature assumptions are 
satisfied at the mean for most sub-samples (i.e., quasi-concavity in inputs) with the 
exception of ISIC 31 and 34. In these cases, a more restrictive Cobb-Douglas 
specification was chosen.23 The parameters of the final specification of each sub-sector 
production function are presented in Table 6.24 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
A key assumption of the stochastic frontier approach is that all firms within a sub-sector 
use the same technology, so this approach does not allow us to compare production 
technologies across sub-sectors. Technical change is captured by the inclusion of fixed 
time effects in the production function which controls for exogenous changes to the 
environment in which the sector operates, and we assume that technical progress/regress 
affects all firms in each sector in the same way.25 Controlling for these aspects, our 
model produces one efficiency score for each firm in each sector, regardless of how 
many time periods they are present in that sector. We calculate a relative efficiency 
measure for each firm by comparing their estimated efficiency score relative to the top 
performing firm in each sector in each year, thus adjusting for firms that exit, enter or 
change activity. Scale effects capture the extent to which changes in the input mix 
improve the performance of the firm. 
                                                 
23 While violations also occur for observations in ISIC 19 and 27, the results of the Cobb-Douglas and 
translog models are very similar so we proceed with the more flexible translog specification.  Efficiency 
results are considered both including and excluding the observations which violate the curvature 
assumptions with almost identical results found in all cases. 
24 It should be noted that in estimating stochastic frontier production functions of this kind it is assumed 
that technology is homogenous across each 2-digit sub-sector analysed. 
25 Non-neutral technical change is not allowed for in our model given the short panel and problems with 
parameter identificaiton. 
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Average rates of change in TFP and its components, weighted by each firms 
contribution to total value added in each sub-sector in each year, are presented in Table 
7. 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
Estimated TFP changes vary considerably across sectors. Of particular note, is the 
strong performance of ISIC 17 (Textiles), ISIC 26 (Non-Metallic Mineral Products) and 
ISIC 35 (Other Transport), which experience TFP growth of between 10 and 12 per cent 
per annum, driven by exogenous technological progress. In fact, where significant, 
technological change drives the productivity performance of most sectors.  The poorest 
performing sectors are ISIC 22 (Publishing and Printing) and ISIC 36 (Furniture) where 
productivity declines between 2001 and 2004.  Scale effects, capturing how changes in 
the input mix of firms improves output possibilities, make an important positive 
contribution to productivity growth in many sectors, suggesting that productivity 
enhancing reallocations of inputs is occurring in the Vietnamese manufacturing sector.  
Changes in average relative efficiency levels make an important contribution to overall 
productivity growth in ISIC 20 (Wood and Wood Products), ISIC 28 (Fabricated 
Metal), ISIC 29 (Machinery and Equipment) and ISIC 32 (Radio and Communication 
Equipment).  Since we assume that firm level efficiency is time invariant, productivity 
enhancing changes in the average efficiency of sectors can be attributed to the entry and 
exit of firms. These results suggest that efficiency enhancing reallocations across sectors 
are important. 
In our analysis of the determinants of firm exit and switching, we rely on technical 
efficiency as a measure of individual firm performance,26 but focus first on differences 
between exits, entrants, switchers and incumbents by sector as presented in Table 8. 
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
Column (1) documents mean relative efficiency differences between incumbents and 
new entrants. Incumbents are on average more efficient than newcomers in all sectors, 
                                                 
26 Firm level efficiency is appropriate for this purpose given that, by construction, it benchmarks firms 
against the best performing firms in each sector, controlling for the technology at hand and exogenous 
technological progress which is assumed to affect all firms in the same way. 
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and in 14 out of 19 sectors the difference is statistically significant. A similar result 
emerges from comparing efficiency differences between incumbents and exits in 
column (2). Our results therefore show that exit is concentrated among the least efficient 
firms, consistent with the findings of for example Aw et al. (2001) for Taiwanese firms 
in the 1980s. However, focusing on efficiency differences between “real” entrants and 
“real” exits in column (3) reveals that exits have on average higher efficiency levels 
than new entrants. This is so in 15 out of 19 cases – and in five sectors the difference is 
statistically significant. This suggests that the standard finding that firm entry and exit 
contribute to a more efficient reallocation of resources (i.e. transferring resources from 
less efficient to more efficient producers) may not hold in the case of the Vietnamese 
manufacturing sector. 27 Switchers certainly merit separate investigation.  
Columns (4) and (5) in Table 8 compare sector switchers with incumbents. Our findings 
confirm that incumbents produce more efficiently than sector switchers (both “IN” and 
“OUT”), in line with the predictions of traditional life-cycle theories. The two 
remaining columns (columns (6) and 7)) compare mean efficiency differences between 
sector switchers and entrants and exits, respectively. In nine out of 19 sectors we find 
that sector switchers are (on average) significantly more efficient producers than “real” 
new entrants. This is also the case for three sectors when sector switchers are compared 
to exits, even if less by way of statistical significance emerges from this comparison.  
Overall, our results indicate that significant efficiency differences exist between 
different types of firms, and the positive contribution to growth from firm dynamics is 
more associated with sector switchers than with standard turnover. Pooling switchers 
with new and closed down firms (i) is potentially misleading in coming to grips with 
relative levels of efficiency, and (ii) would clearly constrain our understanding of the 
underlying process of development and the potential contribution of firm dynamics to 
productivity growth. On this background we turn to analysing the determinants of firm 
exit and switching. 
 
                                                 
27 For example, results for Chile and Columbia find that inefficient plants are replaced with slightly more 
efficient plants, increasing overall productivity in the sector albeit by a small amount (Tybout, 2000). 
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5.2 Sector switching and exit  
We present the first set of results from the random effects probit models of sector 
switching and exit in Table 9, including firm specific explanatory variables only.28 The 
first columns in both the sector switching and exit specification include the weighted 
relative efficiency score together with province, sector and time dummies. As expected, 
we find a significant negative relationship between a firm’s relative efficiency and 
sector switching as well as exit. Less (more) productive firms are more (less) likely to 
switch sector or close down.  
Controlling for firm size and age does not qualitatively change the relative efficiency 
result, and both control variables have the expected (and well-determined) sign in the 
sector switching specification. Older and larger firms are more likely to remain non-
switchers in accordance with the predictions of traditional firm life-cycle theories. Firm 
size has the expected negative sign in both the switching and exit specifications, and 
firm age affects switching negatively, so younger firms are more likely to switch. Yet, 
firm age is positive and significant (contrary to the hypothesized effect) in the second 
exit regression, where ownership is not controlled for. The ongoing reform process (and 
the general legal restructuring of the business sector) is key in explaining this. Older 
firms tend to be SOEs, and many are exiting in the reform process. This corresponds 
with the fact that the effect of firm age is no longer well-determined in the exit 
specification once we control for legal ownership type (column (3)).  
Ownership structure matters for both the sector switching and exit decision, and – as 
hypothesized – state and foreign owned enterprises are less likely to switch than 
domestic privately owned firms. Similarly, in the exit specification foreign owned firms 
are as expected less likely to exit, whereas state owned firms show the opposite 
tendency. Exit is significantly associated with state ownership, and this is, as just noted, 
rooted in the ongoing reform process discussed by CIEM (2003). 
In the final specification the efficiency variable is only well-determined in the exit 
specification. This suggests that relative efficiency is critical in the exit decision, but is 
less of a driving factor behind switching, once other characteristics are accounted for. 
                                                 
28 Results of the conditional fixed effects logit are presented in Appendix Table D. 
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This also corresponds with the widespread (but empirically not verified) impression in 
Vietnam that some firms are looking to switch as a survival strategy since they are 
performing poorly at present, while others switch because they are (dynamic and 
forward looking) firms in search of higher profits elsewhere. 
[TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 10 summarizes results from the same underlying probit model using different sub-
samples.29 Column (1) compares sector switchers with incumbent firms only, whereas 
column (2) is restricted to a comparison between exits and incumbents. These sub-
samples yield the same conclusions as the full-sample, noting especially that sector 
switchers are not significantly less efficient than incumbents. In column (3) in Table 10 
we restrict the sample under consideration to sector switchers and exits only, and there 
is no evidence of a significant efficiency difference between exits and sector switchers, 
even when controlling for size, age, location, sector and ownership form. However, 
sector switchers tend to be larger, younger and with foreign participation than firms 
closing down production. In addition, exit firms are more often found among SOEs, 
which is again as expected given the nature of the reform process in Vietnam. 
[TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 11 presents the results of the sector switching and exit models incorporating our 
set of five sector-level determinants alongside the firm specific variables just discussed. 
Column (1) and column (3) (with province dummies) use the total sample, whereas 
column (2) and  column (4) (with province dummies) are comparable with column (3) 
in Table 9 (comparing switchers and exits only).  
The first and most important observation from Table 11 is that sector level determinants 
are clearly of critical importance in both switching and exit decisions. Most sector-level 
variables are highly significant in both columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4), and the size of the 
estimated probabilities are in some cases quite noticeable, especially in the switching 
                                                 
29 In Table E of the Appendix we analyse differences between firms changing main production to the 
tertiary/service sector and intra-manufacturing sector switchers. We do not find differences in efficiency 
levels (when controlling for size and age). However, among sector switchers the firms that change to 
services are smaller in size compared to firms switching within manufacturing. Moreover, foreign firms 
tend to stay within the manufacturing sector.  
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decision. Moreover, it is equally clear that sector variation should be carefully 
considered in trying to come to grips with the determinants of switching and exit given 
that the introduction of province dummies in columns (3)-(4) has little effect on the 
results. This confirms that industrial policies in Vietnam do indeed appear to be defined 
at national and sector rather than at regional or provincial levels, in line with policy 
declarations and planning documents such as MPI (2003). 
Second, the results in Table 11 confirm that firms are less likely to exit and switch from 
sectors that are highly dominated by SOEs as measured by the SR indicator, and SOE 
domination also leads to lower probabilities for switching out relative to exiting. As 
hypothesised in Section 2, economic reform may be opening up opportunities for 
smaller (private) enterprises in sectors dominated by SOEs, so they start as producers of 
intermediates. However, in understanding the negative exit and switching probabilities 
associated with SR, it is possibly even more important to note that SOEs in Vietnam 
still received preferential treatment during the period under study. Moreover, many and 
well established commercial and personal links continue to exist between SOEs and 
other domestic firms. The domestic enterprise system is therefore highly interlinked, or 
better closely intertwined with SOEs – both in terms of input-output coefficients and 
personal contacts. This is likely to lead to less movement out of this sector in terms of 
exit and switching than would otherwise be the case. However, it is also clear that 
reform efforts are indeed starting to make themselves felt in that exiting is more 
probable than switching. 
Third, the inter-twined nature of the domestic enterprise system has so far not extended 
itself to include foreign owned firms. In contrast with the technology transfer argument 
hypothesised in Section 2, there are in Vietnam repeated reports on limited 
technological spill-over and lack of linkage from foreign to domestic firms (CIEM, 
2003). Firms are attracted to and enter foreign-dominated sectors. Yet, once in, they 
may find it difficult to compete due to less than expected technology transfers and 
tougher competition due to the competitive advantages associated with foreign firms. 
The result is that greater FR increases the probability for firms to either exit or switch 
sector. Moreover, and in contrast with what was noted for the SOE sector variable, 
foreign domination in terms of output share leads to switching being more likely than 
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exit. This probably reflects that firms attracted by the increasing, but still relatively 
recent presence of foreign companies, are typically quite dynamic. Once these 
newcomers realise that it is far from easy to compete and obtain new technology, they 
tend to switch and move on rather than close down.  
Fourth, a high concentration ratio (CR) increases the probability that a firm switches 
sector, but this result does not hold for firm exit decisions, where the parameters are 
negative, but insignificant. It has in Vietnam been hypothesized that the former result 
may be rooted in the observation that a variety of enterprises took steps to switch out of 
highly concentrated sectors in anticipation of the Competition Law, approved in late 
2004 (CIEM, 2006). Similarly, there is likely to be at least some enterprises which have 
been attracted by high concentration ratios only to find after entry that conditions are 
not as permissive as expected, be that due to collusion (as hypothesized in Section 2) or 
unexpected competitive pressures more generally. On the other hand, if firms do 
manage to get established and succeed in developing appropriate networks, which are 
often essential in Vietnam, they tend to stay (corresponding to what was suggested in 
Section 2), and in line with the observation that switching tends to be more likely than 
exit. 
Fifth, a high average sector efficiency level (EFF) tends to increase the probability of 
sector switching and exit. This is as expected, and the fact that switching is more likely 
than exit is in all likelihood due to the fact that the Vietnamese business environment 
does contain – as suggested above – a number of firms which are willing to “try it out” 
in search of opportunities, but which also move on, when opportunities do not 
materialise. 
Sixth, there is as expected a significantly lower probability of switching out from 
sectors that are highly protected. Accordingly, firms tend to stay in these sectors, 
reaping the benefits associated with protection. This is so even if the protection is 
expected to be short lived as has been the case in Vietnam from 2001 to 2004. In 
contrast, the insignificance on exit in column (1) suggests that when decisions on 
whether to close down or remain in a sector are taken, a longer term perspective on firm 
survival dominates. If it is clear that the firm is not sustainable, then better give up right 
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away. Putting focus on columns (2) and (4) we note that these observations are 
consistent with our findings for sector switchers compared with exits only. 
In summary, we have identified a series of highly significant variables affecting firm 
switching out of a sector or closing down. Moreover, sector switchers and exits tend to 
be affected differently by firm and sector specific factors. Younger firms are more likely 
to switch sectors while exit is significantly associated with older firms. The latter result 
is primarily due to changes in ownership structure as state owned firms are more likely 
to exit rather than switch sector as a result of the economic reform process. Foreign 
owned firms are less likely to exit and switch sectors, but when the sample is restricted 
to firms which either exit or switch the latter group has a significantly higher 
concentration of foreign participation. Sector specific differences also exist. A higher 
share of foreign firm output, higher levels of sector concentration and higher sector 
level efficiency are more associated with sector switching than exit. In contrast, sector 
switching is less likely than exits where sectors are either more dominated by SOEs or 
heavily protected. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Much of the literature on industry evolution has found firm turnover to be an important 
source of sector-level productivity growth in the sense that new firms are widely 
understood to have higher productivity than exiting firms. In this paper, we approached 
industry dynamics in Vietnam from a new angle and asked, first, whether the 
delineation of “entry” and “exit” firms matters for the impact of firm turnover on 
growth outcomes. We found that the sub-group of exiting firms, which continue 
production in a different sector have different characteristics to those that cease 
production altogether.  
In the manufacturing sector in Vietnam, less productive firms are more likely to switch 
sector and to exit as predicted by existing literature. However, while firms which switch 
sectors have lower efficiency levels than incumbents, they are often significantly more 
efficient than new entrants. This is important given that average efficiency levels are 
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higher amongst exiting firms compared with entrants once the sector switchers are 
netted out. This actually suggests – in contrast with perceived wisdom – that the 
aggregate turnover effect of “real” exit and entry of firms in the Vietnamese 
manufacturing sector may impact negatively on overall productivity. Moreover, the 
contribution of firm turnover to productivity growth appears more associated with firm 
switching than with traditional interpretations of productivity differentials between 
broadly defined categories of entry and exit firms, which merit more precise definition. 
Secondly, our analysis brought out that there are in addition to productivity differentials 
other distinct and statistically significant differences between the determinants of firm 
switching and firm exit. At firm specific level, younger firms are for example more 
likely to switch sectors while exit is significantly associated with state ownership. Firm 
size is negatively associated with both switching and exit, but appears much more 
important in the exit decision. Differences also exist among SOEs and foreign owned 
firms in the exit decision. SOEs have been more likely to exit, while the opposite is true 
for foreign firms. 
Sector level characteristics tend to play a more influential role in switching than in exit 
decisions, and the direction of impact also differs. For example, our sector level 
measures of competition and efficiency matter differently for firms that switch sector 
compared to those that exit. The former are influenced by the competitiveness of the 
sector they are in as measured through its concentration ratio, the average efficiency 
level and the extent of protection that the sector offers. In contrast, of these factors only 
the efficiency level comes across as critical in the exit decision.  
The insight that sector level determinants are particularly influential in switching 
decisions is potentially very important. As noted, our first finding was that switching 
appears to be at the core of the contribution of firm turnover to growth. Moreover, 
sector level determinants are (alongside ownership characteristics) arguably much more 
directly amenable to policy influence than firm level characteristics such as firm age, 
size and  relative firm-level efficiency. 
A key issue for the Vietnamese manufacturing sector in the coming years is how trade 
liberalisation will impact on productivity and profitability. Much of the literature 
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suggests that this will depend on firm turnover, and focus is typically on how inefficient 
firms can be closed down (exit) and be replaced by new and more efficient ones 
(entrants). The findings of this paper suggest that differences between firms that exit 
and firms that switch sectors are critical and should be considered explicitly in 
formulating policy. In particular, firm ability to reallocate activity across sub-sectors 
(rather than simply close down) appears crucial.  
Finally, we have in this paper (i) aimed at identifying important characteristics of firm 
dynamics in Vietnam in the run up to the WTO liberalisation process that are likely to 
be broadly applicable in other countries in transition, (ii) shed some light on the 
characteristics of reallocating firms, and importantly (iii) established how they differ 
from firms that exit. This is a necessary first step in arriving at policy suggestions that 
are an appropriate guide in the challenging years ahead. Further research on the nature 
of firms, what motivates them and what makes the reallocation process easier in sector 
specific contexts is a next step and a challenge to future research.  
 26
References 
Aitkin, B.J. and Harrison A.E. (1999). “Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign 
Investment? Evidence from Venezuela”, American Economic Review, 89(3), 605-618.  
Alfaro, L. and Rodriguez-Clare, A. (2004). “Multinationals and Linkages: Evidence 
from Latin America”, Economia, 4, 113-170. 
Athukorola, P. (2006). “Trade Policy Reforms and the Structure of Protection in 
Vietnam”, World Economy, 29(2), 161-187. 
Audretsch, D.B. (1991). “New-Firm Survival and the Technological Regime”, Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 73(3), 441-450. 
Aw, B.Y., Chen, X. and Roberts, M.J. (2001). “Firm-level Evidence on Productivity 
Differentials and Turnover in Taiwanese Manufacturing”, Journal of Development 
Economics, 66, 51-86. 
Bartelsman, E. and Doms, M. (2000). "Understanding Productivity: Lessons from 
Longitudinal Microdata", Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 569-594. 
Bernard, A.B., Redding, S.J. and Schott, P.K. (2006a). “Multi-Product Firms and 
Product Switching”, NBER working paper no. 12293, Cambridge, Mass. 
Bernard, A.B., Redding, S.J. and Schott, P.K. (2006b). “Products and Productivity”, 
CEPR discussion paper no. 5126, Cambridge, Mass. 
Blundell, R. and Bond, S. (1998). “Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in 
Dynamic Panel Data Models”, Journal of Econometrics, 87, 115-143. 
Blundell, R. and Bond, S. (2000). “GMM Estimation with Persistent Panel Data: An 
Application to Production Functions”, Econometric Reviews, 19(3), 321-340. 
CIEM (Central Institute of Economic Management) (2003). Developing the Socialist-
Oriented Market Economy in Vietnam, edited by Dr. Dinh Van An, The Statistical 
Publisher, Ha Noi. 
 27
 
CIEM (Central Institute of Economic Management) (2006). Vietnam’s Economy in 
2005 (A Reference Book), The Publishing House of Political Theory, Hanoi. 
Coelli, T. (1996). “A guide to FRONTIER version 4.1: a computer program for frontier 
production function estimation”, CEPA Working Paper 96/07, Department of 
Econometrics, University of New England, Armidale, Australia. 
Coelli, T., Rao, D., O’ Donnell, C. and Battese, G. (2005). An Introduction to Efficiency 
and Productivity Analysis (second edition), Springer, New York. 
Disney, R., Haskel, J. and Heden, Y. (2003). “Restructuring and Productivity Growth in 
UK Manufacturing”, Economic Journal, 113, 666-694. 
Ericson, R. and Pakes, A. (1995). “Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework 
for Empirical Work”, Review of Economics Studies, 62(1), 53-82. 
Eslava, M., Haltiwanger, J., Kugler, A and Kugler, M. (2004). “The Effects of 
Structural Reform on Productivity and Profitability Enhancing Reallocation: Evidence 
from Columbia”, Journal of Development Economics, 75, 333-371. 
Freshfields Bruchhaus Deringer (2006). “Vietnam – New Investment Law”, mimeo - 
download from www.freshfields.com 
Greene, W. (2005). “Fixed and Random Effects in Stochastic Frontier Models”, Journal 
of Productivity Analysis, 23, 7-32. 
GSO (2005). The Real Situation of Enterprises: The Results of Surveys conducted in 
2001-2004, Statistical Publishing House, Hanoi. 
Heltberg, R. and Tarp, F. (2002). “Agricultural Supply Response and Poverty in 
Mozambique”, Food Policy, 27, 103-124. 
Henderson, J.V. (1986). “Efficiency of Resource Usage and City Size”, Journal of 
Urban Economics, 19, 47-70. 
 28
Hopenhayn, H. (1992). “Entry, Exit and Firm Dynamics in Long Run equilibrium”, 
Econometrica, 60(5), 1127-1150. 
Jovanovic, B. (1982). "Selection and the Evolution of Industry", Econometrica, 50(3), 
649-670. 
Javorcik, B. (2004). “Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity of 
Domestic Firms? In Search of Spillovers through Backward Linkages”, American 
Economic Review, 94, 605-627. 
Jefferson, G.H. and Rawski, T.G. (1994). “Enterprise Reform in Chinese Industry”, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(2), 47-70. 
Kumbhakar, S. and Lovell, K. (2000). Stochastic Frontier Analysis, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge.  
Lancaster, T. (2000). “The Incidental Parameters Problem Since 1948”, Journal of 
Econometrics, 95, 391-414. 
Levinsohn, J. and Petrin, A. (2003). “Estimating Production Functions Using Inputs to 
Control for Unobservables”, Review of Economic Studies, 70, 317-341. 
Melitz, M. (2003). “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate 
Industry Productivity”, Econometrica, 71(6), 1695-1725. 
Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) (2006). “The Five-Year Socio-Economic 
Development Plan: 2006-2010”. Hanoi, Vietnam. 
Neyman, J. and Scott, E.L. (1948). “Consistent Estimates Based on Partially Consistent 
Observations”, Econometrica, 16(1), 1-32. 
Olley, G. and Pakes, A. (1996). “The Dynamics of Productivity in the 
Telecommunications Equipment Industry”, Econometrica, 64(6), 1263-1297. 
Orea, L. (2002). “Parametric Decomposition of a Generalised Malmquist Productivity 
Index”, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 18, 5-22. 
 29
 
Pakes, A. and Ericson, R. (1998). “Empirical Implications of Alternative Models of 
Firm Dynamics”, Journal of Economic Theory, 79, 1-45. 
Pavcnik, N. (2002). “Trade Liberalization, Exit and Productivity Improvements: 
Evidence from Chilean Plants”, Review of Economic Studies, 69, 245-276. 
Pitt, M. and Lee, L. (1981). “The Measurement and Sources of Technical Inefficiency in 
Indonesian Weaving Industry”, Journal of Development Economics, 9, 43-64. 
Roberts, M.J. and Tybout, J. (1996). Industrial Evolution in Developing Countries: 
Micro Patterns of Turnover, Productivity and Market Structure, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
Sauer, J, Frohberg, K. and Hockmann, H. (2006). “Stochastic Efficiency Measurement: 
The Curse of Theoretical Consistency”, Journal of Applied Economics, 9(1), 139-165. 
Siegfried, J.J. and Evans, L.B. (1994). “Empirical Studies of Entry and Exit: A Survey 
of the Evidence”, Review of Industrial Organization, 9(2), 121-155. 
Thuyet, P. (1995). “The Emerging Legal Framework for Private Sector Development in 
Vietnam’s Transitional Economy”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1486, 
World Bank, Washington DC. 
Tybout, J.R. (2000). “Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries: How Well Do 
They Do, and Why?”, Journal of Economic Literature, 38, 11-44. 
Van Biesebroeck, J. (2003). “Revisiting Some Productivity Debates”, NBER Working 
Paper Number 10065. 
Wen, M., Li, D. and Lloyd, P. (2002). “Ownership and Technical Efficiency: A Cross-
Section Study on the Third Industrial Census of China”, Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, 50, 709-734. 
 30
Tables 
 
TABLE 1: TWO-DIGIT MANUFACTURING SECTORS 
Sector 15: Manufacture of food products and beverages 
Sector 17: Manufacture of textiles 
Sector 18: Manufacture of wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of fur 
Sector 19: Tanning and dressing of leather, manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddler, harness 
   and footwear 
Sector 20: Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork; manufacture of articles of 
   straw and plaiting materials 
Sector 21: Manufacture of paper and paper products 
Sector 22: Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 
Sector 24: Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
Sector 25: Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
Sector 26: Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
Sector 27: Manufacture of basic metals 
Sector 28: Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 
Sector 29 Manufacture of equipment and machinery 
Sector 31: Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus 
Sector 32: Manufacture of television and communication equipment and apparatus 
Sector 33: Manufacture of medical precision and optical instruments, watches and  clocks 
Sector 34: Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
Sector 35: Manufacture of other transport means 
Sector 36: Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 
Note: The following sub-sectors are excluded from the analysis due to having few firms to facilitate the estimation of a production 
function: 
16: Manufacture of tobacco products 
23: Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 
30: Manufacture of office machinery and computers 
37: Recycling 
 31
TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR PRODUCTION FUNCTION ANALYSIS 
Sector 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 
No. of firms 4,462 816 1,574 498 1,563 823 965 
No of obs. 10,643 1,768 3,249 1,012 3,217 1,895 1,998 
Value Added 
(VND Million)  
628 
(2,275) 
1,277 
(2,935) 
1,478 
(2,883) 
3,070 
(4,809) 
448 
(1,501) 
703 
(1,896) 
746 
(2,214) 
Labour Units 69 
(186) 
161 
(297) 
274 
(404) 
539 
(775) 
73 
(148) 
73 
(109) 
50 
(83) 
Capital 
(VND Million) 
5,848 
(19,133) 
15,195 
(32,831) 
7,751 
(14,973) 
14,128 
(24,978) 
3,353 
(10,359) 
8,828 
(23,531) 
5,708 
(17,811) 
        
Sector 24 25 26 27 28 29 31 
No. of firms 839 1,178 1,711 332 2,158 639 360 
No of obs. 1,873 2,607 4,096 690 4,185 1,311 758 
Value Added 
(VND Million) 
2,045 
(4,492) 
1,058 
(2,864) 
1,390 
(3,677) 
921 
(2,837) 
469 
(1,412) 
954 
(2,127) 
1,725 
(3,722) 
Labour Units 82 
(129) 
91 
(188) 
104 
(190) 
78 
(246) 
52 
(108) 
86 
(151) 
107 
(191) 
Capital 
(VND Million) 
17,443 
(31,880) 
12,068 
(25,846) 
8,510 
(25,501) 
13,107 
(31,841) 
6,231 
(18.302) 
9,371 
(19,687) 
21,924 
(43,868) 
      
Sector 32 33 34 35 36 
No. of firms 181 89 341 481 1,611 
No of obs. 372 188 707 1,028 3,115 
Value Added 
(VND Million) 
4,071 
(6,368) 
1,422 
(2,946) 
1,102 
(2,917) 
1,124 
(2,511) 
663 
(1,706) 
Labour Units 147 
(206) 
159 
(317) 
91 
(189) 
119 
(190) 
117 
(245) 
Capital 
(VND Million) 
33,770 
(50,899) 
26,043 
(55,670) 
14,904 
(37,781) 
16,416 
(36,272) 
6,800 
(16,399) 
  
Note: Variance of variables given in parenthesis, and value added, labour units and capital are mean values. 
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TABLE 3: OVERVIEW OF FIRM DYNAMICS 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
Sector switch IN .. 214 466 489 1,169 
(SW1) .. [212] [330] [250] [792] 
 .. (2,0) (3,9) (3,5) (2,6) 
Sector switch OUT 301 607 523 .. 1,431 
(SW2) [298] [483] [295] .. [1,076] 
 (3,6) (5,7) (4,4) .. (3,2) 
Entrants .. 2,125 2,581 3,419 8,125 
(ENTRY) .. .. .. .. .. 
 .. (19,8) (21,8) (24,8) (18,2) 
Exits 682 1,088 1,308 .. 3,078 
(EXIT) [682] [662] [593] .. [1,937] 
 (8,2) (10,1) (11,1) .. (6,9) 
Total 8,351 10,743 11,814 13,804 44,712 
 [8,339] [8,608] [7,416] [6,580] [30,943] 
Note: Total number of firms (percentage in parenthesis). In brackets the number of observations 
without missing information on firm age. Sector switch IN (SW1): The number of firms that switched 
from another 2-digit ISIC sector. Sector switch OUT (SW2): The number of firms that switch main 
sector the coming year.  
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TABLE 4: SECTOR DETAILS ON SECTOR SWITCHERS 
  Switch to: 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 25 26 27 28 29 31 32 33 34 35 36 OTH AGR SER
Total  
switchers
Percent 
of total Exits 
Percent  
of total 
ISIC 15   1  2 1  4  1  3    1 1 1 1 1 5 70 92 (1.4) 562 (8.5) 
ISIC 17 1  14  1 2  1 7            1 4 31 (3.3) 68 (7.1) 
ISIC 18  15  12 2 1 1  2   1   1    2  1 27 65 (4.2) 125 (8.1) 
ISIC 19   7  1    2  1 1       3   4 19 (3.3) 43 (7.5) 
ISIC 20 3  1   4  3 2 3 1 4      3 91  4 33 152 (8.7) 141 (8.1) 
ISIC 21 2 1 2  2  10  8 1         1   6 33 (3.1) 83 (7.7) 
ISIC 22   2   16      1 1  1       8 29 (3.2) 62 (6.9) 
ISIC 24 5 3   1 1 1  2 8  2  1  1   2  4 12 43 (4.2) 69 (6.7) 
ISIC 25  2 2 3 1 3 2 3  1 1 2 2 1 1  1 4 8 1 1 17 56 (4.2) 90 (6.7) 
ISIC 26     3  1 9 2  1 1       5  13 27 62 (2.5) 236 (9.4) 
ISIC 27     1     2  9      1    3 16 (4.5) 32 (8.9) 
ISIC 28 1   2 1 2 1  3 3 22  21 5   8 10 7  1 40 127 (6.8) 143 (7.7) 
ISIC 29 1      1  3   22  5  1 3 2 1   17 56 (8.2) 56 (8.2) 
ISIC 31      1      4 1  7  1  2   7 23 (5.7) 18 (4.5) 
ISIC 32            3  2  1    1  2 9 (4.7) 11 (5.7) 
ISIC 33          2  2 2     1    3 10 (8.9) 4 (3.6) 
ISIC 34         1   10 5     18   1 17 52 (12.7) 28 (6.8) 
ISIC 35 2    1    3   9 2 1   11  3   11 43 (7.4) 45 (7.8) 
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ISIC 36   2  82 3  3 7 1 2 5 1  3  1     48 158 (10.3) 121 (7.9) 
  
Total  
switchers 15 21 31 17 98 34 17 23 42 22 28 79 35 15 13 4 26 40 126 3 31 356 1,076 (4.4) 1,937 (8.0) 
 
Percent  
of total (0.2) (2.2) (2.0) (3.0) (5.6) (3.1) (1.9) (2.2) (3.1) (0.9) (7.8) (4.3) (5.1) (3.7) (6.7) (3.6) (6.3) (6.9) (8.3)    (4.4)    
Note: Total number of firms switching from/to a particular sector (percentage in parenthesis). OTH = ISIC 16, ISIC 23, ISIC 30 and ISIC 37. AGR = Agriculture/Primary sector. SER = Service/tertiary sector. Only firms for which 
efficiency estimates could be calculated are included. 
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TABLE 5: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR SECTOR SWITCHING ANALYSIS 
SECTOR SPECIFIC VARIABLES 
ISIC  Main production sector SR FR CR EFF ERP 
15 Food products and beverages 0.419 0.139 0.047 0.386 72.980 
17 Textiles  0.498 0.243 0.172 0.586 70.790 
18 Wearing apparel 0.279 0.327 0.057 0.693 70.560 
19 Leather products 0.235 0.322 0.125 0.658 39.150 
20 Wood and wood products  0.260 0.124 0.088 0.678 1.150 
21 Paper and paper products 0.330 0.152 0.130 0.636 17.090 
22 Publishing and printing 0.762 0.031 0.098 0.452 -4.090 
24 Chemical and chemical products 0.571 0.199 0.147 0.478 9.670 
25 Rubber and plastic products 0.265 0.299 0.128 0.621 35.670 
26 Non-metallic mineral products 0.538 0.087 0.075 0.587 50.830 
27 Basic metal 0.626 0.135 0.492 0.455 0.750 
28 Fabricated metal products 0.294 0.250 0.077 0.696 -20.940 
29 Machinery and equipment 0.587 0.127 0.127 0.622 -8.580 
31 Electrical machinery and app.  0.385 0.452 0.298 0.352 13.150 
32 Radio and communication equip. 0.239 0.616 0.218 0.646 13.430 
33 Medical and optical instruments 0.080 0.495 0.503 0.363 -2.950 
34 Assembling/repairing motor vehicles 0.327 0.415 0.184 0.370 79.220 
35 Repairing of other transport equip. 0.445 0.334 0.143 0.314 28.100 
36 Furniture 0.060 0.392 0.084 0.694 23.610 
Manufacturing average 0.348 0.388 0.205 0.100 38.137 
Note: Summary statistics are based on the same 24,363 observations used in Table 9. SR = State owned enterprise 
(SOE) share of total sector output. FR = Foreign owned enterprise share of total sector output. CR = Ratio of the four 
largest firms accumulated revenue to the total revenue in the sector. EFF = Average sector efficiency score (EFF) 
calculated from the individual firm efficiency levels. ERP = Effective rate of protection, estimates obtained from 
Arthukorola (2006). 
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TABLE 6: PARAMETER ESTIMATES OF GROUP SPECIFIC PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS 
Sector 15 17 18 19 
Constant 0.734*** (0.046) 0.415*** (0.060) 0.167*** (0.036) 0.243*** (0.071) 
1ln x  0.661*** (0.015) 0.731*** (0.037) 0.856*** (0.026) 0.769*** (0.040) 
2ln x  0.466*** (0.013) 0.352*** (0.030) 0.297*** (0.025) 0.314*** (0.045) 
1ln x * 1ln x  0.048*** (0.008) -0.037** (0.015) 0.030** (0.012) 0.014 (0.019) 
2ln x * 2ln x  0.045*** (0.005) 0.014 (0.009) 0.028*** (0.010) 0.059*** (0.015) 
1ln x * 2ln x  -0.043*** (0.010) -0.006 (0.016) -0.043** (0.017) -0.082*** (0.026) 
Dummy 2002 0.105*** (0.018) 0.143*** (0.051) -0.084** (0.038) 0.032 (0.059) 
Dummy 2003 0.052*** (0.019) 0.134*** (0.051) 0.086** (0.038) 0.176*** (0.056) 
Dummy 2004 0.018 (0.019) 0.313*** (0.051) 0.093** (0.038) 0.182*** (0.055) 
γˆ  0.490*** (0.015) 0.705*** (0.025) 0.875*** (0.024) 0.916*** (0.023) 
μˆ  1.198*** (0.055) Restricted to zero -3.395*** (0.887) -4.064*** (1.303) 
Log likelihood -12,169.77 -2,147.44 -3,807.50 -1,205.59 
Sector 20 21 22 24 
Constant 0.211*** (0.051) 0.279*** (0.043) 0.574*** (0.140) 0.729*** (0.129) 
1ln x  0.830*** (0.036) 0.726*** (0.041) 0.901*** (0.042) 0.677*** (0.047) 
2ln x  0.348*** (0.035) 0.454*** (0.031) 0.437*** (0.033) 0.604*** (0.035) 
1ln x * 1ln x  0.012 (0.011) -0.016 (0.035) -0.002 (0.031) 0.057* (0.030) 
2ln x * 2ln x  0.012 (0.008) 0.043*** (0.016) 0.042*** (0.015) 0.039** (0.012) 
1ln x * 2ln x  0.015 (0.015) -0.014 (0.042) -0.037 (0.038) -0.069** (0.031) 
Dummy 2002 -0.045 (0.011) 0.008 (0.039) 0.051 (0.041) 0.024 (0.048) 
Dummy 2003 0.011 (0.010) -0.002 (0.040) 0.090** (0.040) -0.001 (0.048) 
Dummy 2004 0.037 (0.015) 0.124*** (0.040) -0.055 (0.040) -0.106** (0.049) 
γˆ  0.884*** (0.037) 0.926*** (0.033) 0.590*** (0.036) 0.645*** (0.051) 
μˆ  -3.243 (3.116) -3.943 (2.537) 1.071*** (0.185) 0.964*** (0.270) 
Log likelihood -3,507.73 -2,065.29 -1,992.56 -2,277.06 
Sector 25 26 27 28 
Constant 0.336*** (0.048) 0.380*** (0.034) 0.729*** (0.087) 0.257*** (0.034) 
1ln x  0.662*** (0.032) 0.688*** (0.026) 0.737*** (0.069) 0.754*** (0.023) 
2ln x  0.530*** (0.028) 0.485*** (0.019) 0.482*** (0.047) 0.461*** (0.018) 
1ln x * 1ln x  0.032 (0.021) -0.007 (0.015) 0.048 (0.041) -0.031** (0.016) 
2ln x * 2ln x  0.072*** (0.011) 0.039*** (0.007) 0.087*** (0.020) 0.049*** (0.007) 
1ln x * 2ln x  -0.101*** (0.026) -0.044** (0.018) -0.098* (0.053) -0.023 (0.018) 
Dummy 2002 … 0.132*** (0.025) 0.166* (0.085) -0.077** (0.033) 
Dummy 2003 … 0.154** * (0.026) 0.127 (0.086) -0.015 (0.034) 
Dummy 2004 … 0.257*** (0.026) 0.046 (0.0855) -0.012 (0.033) 
γˆ  0.895*** (0.059) 0.766 *** (0.012) 0.381*** (0.053) 0.865*** (0.025) 
μˆ  -3.281*** (3.1729) Restricted to zero 1.038*** (0.055) -3.187*** (0.795) 
Log likelihood -3,061.35 -4,168.85 -816.75 -4,789.87 
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Sector 29 31♣ 32 33 
Constant 0.396*** (0.074) 1.281*** (0.171) 0.475*** (0.074) 1.278*** (0.299) 
1ln x  0.650*** (0.045) 0.573*** (0.050) 0.332*** (0.076) 0.824*** (0.101) 
2ln x  0.499*** (0.038) 0.604*** (0.037) 0.756*** (0.056) 0.337*** (0.081) 
1ln x * 1ln x  0.001 (0.031) … 0.036 (0.051) … 
2ln x * 2ln x  0.048*** (0.018) … 0.081*** (0.020) … 
1ln x * 2ln x  -0.054 (0.041) … -0.164*** (0.053) … 
Dummy 2002 0.023 (0.053) … … … 
Dummy 2003 0.004 (0.053) … … … 
Dummy 2004 0.095* (0.053) … … … 
γˆ  0.884*** (0.070) 0.569*** (0.058) 0.944*** (0.027) 0.656*** (0.072) 
μˆ  -2.341 (2.701) 1.430*** (0.247) -4.508* (2.694) 1.501*** (0.392) 
Log likelihood -1,495.70 -914.79 -423.63 -215.01 
Sector 34♣ 35 36 
Constant 1.005*** (0.158) 0.983 *** (0.148) 0.264*** (0.042) 
1ln x  0.904*** (0.044) 0.745*** (0.059) 0.756*** (0.026) 
2ln x  0.297*** (0.027) 0.399*** (0.045) 0.406*** (0.024) 
1ln x * 1ln x  … 0.050 (0.036) 0.020 (0.015) 
2ln x * 2ln x  … 0.049*** (0.015) 0.048*** (0.009) 
1ln x * 2ln x  … -0.085** (0.038) -0.059*** (0.020) 
Dummy 2002 … 0.225*** (0.060) -0.006 (0.038) 
Dummy 2003 … 0.244*** (0.060)  -0.127*** (0.037) 
Dummy 2004 … 0.260*** (0.066) -0.108*** (0.036) 
γˆ  0.624*** (0.035) 0.598*** (0.030) 0.868*** (0.018) 
μˆ  1.371*** (0.204) 1.436*** (0.170) -3.257*** (0.530) 
Log likelihood -779.74 -1,242.07 -3,629.46 
 
1ln x  is the log of labour, 2ln x  the log of capital,  3ln x  the log of material costs, γˆ  an estimate of the share of technical 
efficiency in total variance and μˆ  the mean of the distribution of inefficiency effects. 
Standard errors are given in parenthesis, *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, * 
indicates significance at the 10% level 
♣Restricted to Cobb-Douglas model due to violation of theoretical properties 
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TABLE 7: AVERAGE CHANGE IN WEIGHTED TFP 2001-2004 
  
Technical 
Efficiency
Technical 
Progress 
Scale 
Effects TFP 
ISIC 15 -0.03 0.40 1.39 1.77 
ISIC 17 0.38 11.16 0.25 11.84 
ISIC 18 0.10 4.35 0.85 5.36 
ISIC 19 0.57 6.46 0.17 7.23 
ISIC 20 2.27 1.69 2.22 6.18 
ISIC 21 0.48 4.85 0.92 6.33 
ISIC 22 -0.22 -2.86 1.64 -1.46 
ISIC 24 -0.13 3.99 1.56 5.48 
ISIC 25 0.30 0.00 1.21 1.51 
ISIC 26 0.01 8.96 0.80 9.84 
ISIC 27 0.45 0.77 1.82 3.01 
ISIC 28 2.37 0.54 1.68 4.69 
ISIC 29 3.18 3.61 0.90 7.71 
ISIC 31 0.32 0.00 1.45 1.77 
ISIC 32 2.46 0.00 0.01 2.46 
ISIC 33 0.57 0.00 0.42 0.99 
ISIC 34 0.26 0.00 1.86 2.12 
ISIC 35 -0.58 8.62 1.70 9.93 
ISIC 36 0.84 -3.19 1.75 -0.67 
Note: All figures in percentage 
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TABLE 8: MEAN RELATIVE EFFICIENCY DIFFERENCES 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
INC-
ENTRY INC-EXIT
ENTRY-
EXIT INC-SW1 INC-SW2
SW1-
ENTRY 
SW2-
EXIT 
by sector t-test t-test t-test t-test t-test t-test t-test 
ISIC 15 0.0137*** 0.0001** 0.0000 0.0183 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
 (3.18) (2.41) (0.12) (0.98) (1.14) (0.78) (0.60) 
ISIC 17 0.1687*** 0.0014* -0.0003* 0.1313 0.0002 0.0004** 0.0012**
 (3.30) (1.84) (1.75) (1.05) (0.17) (2.53) (2.02) 
ISIC 18 0.0907*** 0.0009*** 0.0001 0.0982** 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0006***
 (6.94) (4.75) (0.94) (2.21) (0.98) (0.34) (2.97) 
ISIC 19 0.2474*** 0.0021** -0.0002 0.3207** 0.0028* -0.0005 -0.0007 
 (3.41) (2.42) (0.30) (2.25) (1.73) (0.63) (0.87) 
ISIC 20 0.1009*** 0.0008** -0.0002** 0.0802 0.0007 0.0002*** 0.0001 
 (3.86) (2.24) (2.42) (1.36) (1.60) (2.82) (0.82) 
ISIC 21 0.0760 0.0011* 0.0005 0.1498 0.0014 -0.0007 -0.0003 
 (1.42) (1.69) (0.86) (1.54) (1.27) (0.84) (1.12) 
ISIC 22 0.1171*** 0.0010** -0.0001 0.1310 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0011 
 (3.07) (2.02) (0.19) (0.99) (0.05) (0.14) (1.47) 
ISIC 24 0.1329*** 0.0008* -0.0005* 0.1425** 0.0013* 0.0000 -0.0005 
 (4.31) (1.89) (1.90) (2.16) (1.95) (0.19) (0.99) 
ISIC 25 0.1083*** 0.0010** -0.0001 0.0181 0.0010 0.0009*** 0.0000 
 (3.68) (2.22) (0.58) (0.25) (1.36) (3.03) (0.08) 
ISIC 26 0.0251 0.0004* 0.0002 0.0640 0.0004 -0.0004 0.0000 
 (1.56) (1.65) (0.65) (1.18) (0.80) (0.78) (0.07) 
ISIC 27 0.2762 0.0038 0.0011 0.3941 0.0015 -0.0008 0.0023**
 (1.45) (1.29) (1.12) (1.24) (0.34) (0.77) (2.16) 
ISIC 28 0.0720*** 0.0003 -0.0004** 0.0197 0.0007** 0.0005** -0.0003 
 (4.75) (1.41) (2.09) (0.58) (1.99) (2.31) (1.18) 
ISIC 29 0.1938*** 0.0013 -0.0008* 0.1337 0.0011 0.0007 0.0002 
 (2.82) (1.32) (1.75) (1.02) (0.95) (1.09) (0.20) 
ISIC 31 0.2776*** 0.0015 -0.0013 0.0373 0.0024 0.0024** -0.0009 
 (3.17) (1.08) (1.41) (0.20) (1.28) (2.32) (0.53) 
ISIC 32 0.9370*** 0.0079 -0.0013 1.0713** 0.0084 -0.0001 -0.0005 
 (2.56) (1.59) (0.55) (2.19) (1.54) (0.06) (0.16) 
ISIC 33 1.1092 0.0106 -0.0004 1.1227 0.0109 0.0005** -0.0003 
 (1.26) (1.32) (0.64) (1.12) (0.96) (2.38) (0.47) 
ISIC 34 0.3180 0.0017 -0.0012 -0.0515 0.0031 0.0037* -0.0014 
 (1.61) (0.65) (0.56) (0.16) (1.22) (1.76) (0.61) 
ISIC 35 0.1906** 0.0018 -0.0001 0.0433 0.0015 0.0015*** 0.0003 
 (2.27) (1.61) (0.34) (0.37) (1.07) (2.62) (0.93) 
ISIC 36 0.1107*** 0.0010*** -0.0001 0.0731* 0.0007* 0.0004*** 0.0003 
 (5.42) (3.00) (0.92) (1.85) (1.79) (3.37) (1.34) 
Sector difference negative  
(percent of total sectors) 0.0 0.0 78.9 5.3 5.3 42.1 52.6 
Percent positive  
and significant  73.7 57.9 0.0 26.3 21.1 47.4 15.8 
Note: Difference in weighted relative efficiency (t-stats in parenthesis - *, **, *** indicate significance at a 10%. 5% and 1% level, 
respectively.). Numbers reported relates to the year 2003. A similar general pattern emerges using estimates from 2002. Incumbents 
= INC. Sector Switchers = SW. Exits = EXIT. Entrants = ENTRY. 
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TABLE 9: SECTOR SWITCHING AND EXIT DETERMINANTS - FIRM SPECIFIC EXPLANATIONS 
  Sector Switching (SW2)  Firm Exit (EXIT) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Firm specific variables       
Relative efficiency (weighted) -43.7414*** -15.1230** -9.7153 -45.7931*** -22.2958*** -17.5795***
 (6.22) (2.34) (1.55) (6.08) (3.11) (2.55) 
Firm size (log)  -0.1257*** -0.0843***  -0.1592*** -0.1869***
  (7.05) (4.46)  (7.16) (7.91) 
Firm age (log)  -0.1782*** -0.1182***  0.1367*** 0.0218 
  (4.71) (2.98)  (3.54) (0.61) 
State owned enterprise (SOE)   -0.5335***   0.5090***
   (5.42)   (6.62) 
Foreign owned firm (Multinational)   -0.2285***   -0.4127***
      (2.99)     (4.70) 
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 24,363 24,363 24,363 24,363 24,363 24,363 
Groups 10,570 10,570 10,570 10,570 10,570 10,570 
Log Likelihood -3872.61 -3827.66 -3809.49 -6572.56 -6519.94 -6464.44 
Wald (chi-sq) 683.53 743.80 757.50 161.81 173.56 202.38 
Likelihood ratio test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.01 0.00 0.00 
Note: Dependent variable: Sector switching (SW2) and exit (EXIT). Random effects probit estimation. All estimations included a constant 
term and time dummies. t-values reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Base: Food 
processing and HCMC. The total number of sector switchers and exits are 1,076 and 1,937 in the unbalanced panel, respectively.  
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TABLE 10: SECTOR SWITCHING AND EXIT DETERMINANTS 
FIRM SPECIFIC EXPLANATIONS, CONTINUED 
  SW2 (INC) EXIT (INC) SW2 (EXIT) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Firm specific variables    
Relative efficiency (weighted) -9.7675 -18.1121*** 5.3856 
 (1.54) (2.61) (0.35) 
Firm size (log) -0.1018*** -0.1963*** 0.0703** 
 (5.25) (8.38) (1.97) 
Firm age (log) -0.1219*** 0.0148 -0.1465** 
 (3.03) (0.41) (2.02) 
State owned enterprise (SOE) -0.5023*** 0.5015*** -1.3764*** 
 (5.01) (6.59) (7.86) 
Foreign owned firm (Multinational) -0.2528*** -0.4323*** 0.3400** 
  (3.26) (4.94) (2.10) 
Provincial dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 22,426 23,287 3,013 
Groups 9,705 10,316 2,850 
Log Likelihood -3704.26 -6356.28 -1611.30 
Wald (chi-sq) 770.98 211.18 386.95 
Likelihood ratio test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: See Table 9 for details.  
 
 41
TABLE 11: SECTOR SWITCHING AND EXIT DETERMINANTS - SECTOR SPECIFIC EXPLANATIONS 
    All 
SW2  
(EXIT) All SW2 (EXIT)
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sector specific variables         
SOE share of total sector (SR) SW2 -0.1116*** -0.3165*** -0.1065*** -0.2977*** 
  (7.30) (5.70) (6.91) (5.31) 
 EXIT -0.0397**  -0.0338*  
  (2.24)  (1.89)  
Multinational share of total sector (FR) SW2 0.1682*** 0.5464*** 0.1410*** 0.4237*** 
  (8.01) (7.38) (6.45) (5.52) 
 EXIT 0.0445*  0.0432*  
  (1.91)  (1.82)  
Sector concentration ratio (CR) SW2 0.1183*** 0.5633*** 0.0583* 0.2982** 
  (3.95) (4.66) (1.79) (2.44) 
 EXIT -0.0251  -0.0277  
  (0.72)  (0.75)  
Sector efficiency level (EFF) SW2 0.1420*** 0.4452*** 0.1183*** 0.2984*** 
  (8.53) (6.78) (6.15) (4.17) 
 EXIT 0.0811***  0.0789***  
  (3.74)  (3.38)  
Sector effective rate of protection (ERP) SW2 -0.0006*** -0.0027*** -0.0005*** -0.0021*** 
  (9.51) (10.83) (6.48) (7.80) 
 EXIT 0.0001  0.0002**  
  (1.50)  (2.06)  
Province dummies   No No Yes Yes 
Observations  24,363 3,013 24,363 3,013 
Groups  10,570 2,850 10,570 2,850 
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Appendix 
 
TABLE A: SECTOR DETAILS ON SECTOR SWITCHERS – INCLUDING ENTRANTS 
  Switch to: 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 24 25 26 27 28 29 31 32 33 34 35 36 OTH AGR SER
Total  
switchers
Percent  
of total 
Total 
exits 
Percent  
of total 
ISIC 15  1 1  2 1  11  1  4    1 1 1 1  6 70 101 (1.3) 756 (9.8) 
ISIC 17 1  23 1 3 2 1 1 10           1 1 4 48 (3.9) 101 (8.2) 
ISIC 18  24  14 2 1 5  3   2   1    3  1 27 83 (3.9) 246 (11.5) 
ISIC 19  2 9  1    4  1 2 1      3   4 27 (3.8) 75 (10.6) 
ISIC 20 3 2 1 1  6  3 5 3 1 5      4 130  4 33 201 (9.0) 231 (10.3) 
ISIC 21 2 1 2  2  18  10 1  1       2   6 45 (3.4) 124 (9.4) 
ISIC 22  1 2  1 25   2   2 1 1 2    1 1  8 47 (3.7) 136 (10.7) 
ISIC 24 7 3  1 1 1 1  4 9  3  1  1   4  4 12 52 (4.0) 117 (9.0) 
ISIC 25  2 3 4 2 7 5 5  1 1 11 3 2 1  2 5 9 1 1 17 82 (4.7) 144 (8.2) 
ISIC 26     4 1 1 14 3  1 6  1  1   6  13 27 78 (2.7) 311 (10.6) 
ISIC 27     1    1 2  16    1  1  1  3 26 (5.5) 41 (8.7) 
ISIC 28 1  1 2 2 3 1 1 5 4 29  37 9  1 9 15 11  1 41 173 (6.5) 292 (10.9) 
ISIC 29 1 1   1  1  3 1  33  11 1 2 5 3 2   17 82 (9.1) 101 (11.1) 
ISIC 31      1   1   7 2  9  2  2   7 31 (6.0) 37 (7.2) 
ISIC 32       1     4 1 4  2  1  2  2 17 (7.0) 23 (9.4) 
ISIC 33          2  2 3     1 1   3 12 (9.3) 10 (7.8) 
ISIC 34 1        2   14 6 2    23 1  1 17 67 (13.0) 49 (9.5) 
ISIC 35 2    2    3   10 3 1   16  3   11 51 (6.9) 72 (9.7) 
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ISIC 36   2 1 104 3 4 7 8 3 2 15 3 1 4  1 1  1  48 208 (10.1) 212 (10.3) 
  
Total  
switchers 18 37 44 24 128 51 38 42 64 27 35 137 60 33 18 9 36 55 179 7 32 357 1,431 (4.6) 3,078 (10.0) 
 
Percent  
of total (0.2) (3.0) (2.1) (3.4) (5.7) (3.9) (3.0) (3.2) (3.6) (0.9) (7.5) (5.1) (6.6) (6.4) (7.4) (7.0) (7.0) (7.4) (8.7)    (4.6)    
 
Total  
entrants 811 190 448 104 369 169 266 187 287 335 81 589 163 80 38 11 70 107 401    4,706    
 
Percent  
of total (10.5) (15.5) (20.9) (14.8) (16.5) (12.8) (20.9) (14.4) (16.3) (11.4) (17.3) (22.0) (18.0) (15.5) (15.6) (8.5) (13.6) (14.4) (19.4)    (15.2)    
Note: Total number of firms switching from/to a particular sector (percentage in parenthesis). OTH = ISIC 16, ISIC 23, ISIC 30 and ISIC 37. AGR = Agriculture/Primary sector. SER = Service/tertiary sector. Only firms for which efficiency estimates could 
be calculated are included. 
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TABLE B: PRODUCTION FUNCTION ESTIMATION – SPECIFICATION TESTING 
Sector 15 0klβ =  0tω =  0μ =  0γ =  
LL Restricted -12,277 -12,191 -12,191 -12,986 
LL Unrestricted -12,191 -12,170 -12,170 -12,170 
Test Statistic 172.99 41.60 42.94 1,633.25 
Result Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) 
Sector 17♦ 0klβ =  0tω =  0μ =  0γ =  
LL Restricted -2,172 -2,166 -2,147 -2,264 
LL Unrestricted -2,166 -2,147 -2,147 -2,147 
Test Statistic 13.28 37.64 1.18 233.72 
Result Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) Do not reject Reject null (1%) 
Sector 18 0klβ =  0tω =  0μ =  0γ =  
LL Restricted -3,831 -3,824 -3,816 -3,978 
LL Unrestricted -3,824 -3,807 -3,807 -3,807 
Test Statistic 13.22 33.72 17.20 341.48 
Result Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) 
Sector 19 0klβ =  0tω =  0μ =  0γ =  
LL Restricted -1,223 -1,212 -1,211 -1,297 
LL Unrestricted -1,212 -1,206 -1,206 -1,206 
Test Statistic 21.07 13.28 11.22 183.35 
Result Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) 
Sector 20 0klβ =  0tω =  0μ =  0γ =  
LL Restricted -3,524 -3,511 -3,510 -3,700 
LL Unrestricted -3,511 -3,507 -3,507 -3,507 
Test Statistic 25.74 7.28 6.41 386.47 
Result Reject null (1%) Reject null (10%) Reject null (5%) Reject null (1%) 
Sector 21 0klβ =  0tω =  0μ =  0γ =  
LL Restricted -2,087 -2,073 -2,069 -2,284 
LL Unrestricted -2,073 -2,065 -2,065 -2,065 
Test Statistic 28.26 15.01 7.89 436.62 
Result Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) 
Sector 22 0klβ =  0tω =  0μ =  0γ =  
LL Restricted -2,013 -2,004 -2,001 -2,187 
LL Unrestricted -2,004 -1,993 -1,993 -1,993 
Test Statistic 18.20 23.29 17.13 389.03 
Result Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) 
Sector 24 0klβ =  0tω =  0μ =  0γ =  
LL Restricted -2,288 -2,282 -2,280 -2,471 
LL Unrestricted -2,282 -2,277 -2,277 -2,277 
Test Statistic 12.26 10.59 5.89 388.97 
Result Reject null (1%) Reject null (5%) Reject null (5%) Reject null (1%) 
Sector 25 0klβ =  0tω =  0μ =  0γ =  
LL Restricted -3,085 -3,061 -3,064 -3,302 
LL Unrestricted -3,061 -3,061 -3,061 -3,061 
Test Statistic 46.72 1.67 6.16 481.23 
Result Reject null (1%) Do not reject Reject null (5%) Reject null (1%) 
Sector 26♦ 0klβ =  0tω =  0μ =  0γ =  
LL Restricted -4,237 -4,216 4,169 -4,578 
LL Unrestricted -4,216 -4,168 -4,168 -4,169 
Test Statistic 41.47 95.64 1.15 871.45 
Result Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) Do not reject Reject null (1%) 
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TABLE B CONTINUED: PRODUCTION FUNCTION ESTIMATION – SPECIFICATION TESTING 
Sector 27 0klβ =  0tω =  0μ =  0γ =  
LL Restricted -833 -821 -819 -847 
LL Unrestricted -821 -817 -817 -821 
Test Statistic 23.86 9.36 4.10 51.44 
Result Reject null (1%) Reject null (5%) Reject null (5%) Reject null (1%) 
Sector 28 0klβ =  0tω =  0μ =  0γ =  
LL Restricted -4,839 -4,794 -4,797 -5,014 
LL Unrestricted -4,794 -4,790 -4,790 -4,790 
Test Statistic 90.55 7.40 14.00 450.22 
Result Reject null (1%) Reject null (10%) Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) 
Sector 29 0klβ =  0tω =  0μ =  0γ =  
LL Restricted -1,505 -1,499 -1,497 -1,618 
LL Unrestricted -1,499 -1,496 -1,496 -1,496 
Test Statistic 11.89 6.92 3.13 245.49 
Result Reject null (1%) Reject null (10%) Reject null (10%) Reject null (1%) 
Sector 31♦ 0klβ =  0tω =  0μ =  0γ =  
LL Restricted -915 -894 -895 -962 
LL Unrestricted -894 -894 -894 -895 
Test Statistic 40.78 1.59 1.18 134.48 
Result Reject null (1%) Do not reject Do not reject Reject null (1%) 
Sector 32 0klβ =  0tω =  0μ =  0γ =  
LL Restricted -436 -424 -426 -473 
LL Unrestricted -424 -421 -424 -424 
Test Statistic 24.75 5.30 3.91 99.79 
Result Reject null (1%) Do not reject Reject null (5%) Reject null (1%) 
Sector 33 0klβ =  0tω =  0μ =  0γ =  
LL Restricted -215 -215 -217 -241 
LL Unrestricted -214 -213 -215 -215 
Test Statistic 1.38 4.77 4.58 52.46 
Result Do not reject Do not reject Reject null (5%) Reject null (1%) 
Sector 34♦ 0klβ =  0tω =  0μ =  0γ =  
LL Restricted -780 -735 -736 -794 
LL Unrestricted -735 -732 -735 -736 
Test Statistic 90.32 4.36 2.57 116.53 
Result Reject null (1%) Do not reject Do not reject Reject null (1%) 
Sector 35 0klβ =  0tω =  0μ =  0γ =  
LL Restricted -1,258 -1,251 -1,255 -1,343 
LL Unrestricted -1,251 -1,242 -1,242 -1,242 
Test Statistic 14.08 18.47 25.67 201.72 
Result Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) 
Sector 36 0klβ =  0tω =  0μ =  0γ =  
LL Restricted -3,655 -3,639 -3,641 -3,796 
LL Unrestricted -3,639 -3,629 -3,629 -3,629 
Test Statistic 32.36 19.45 23.52 333.37 
Result Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) Reject null (1%) 
♦ Tests are re-run for the restrictions 0klβ =  and 0tω =  imposing the restriction 0μ = . The results are confirmed. 
 
 45
TABLE C: THEORETICAL PROPERTIES OF ESTIMATED PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS 
Sector 15 17 18 19 20 
1ln lny x∂ ∂ : Mean 0.6040 0.8369 0.8606 0.8710 0.7846 
       % negative 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2ln lny x∂ ∂ : Mean 0.3506 0.3116 0.2564 0.2164 0.3002 
       % negative 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.52 0.00 
Curvature Violation (%) 0.13 0.00 0.00 24.51 0.00 
Sector 21 22 24 25 26 
1ln lny x∂ ∂ : Mean 0.7678 0.9611 0.6735 0.7532 0.7962 
       % negative 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2ln lny x∂ ∂ : Mean 0.3492 0.3342 0.5477 0.4073 0.3732 
       % negative 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 
Curvature Violation (%) 0.63 0.00 0.00 7.10 0.00 
Sector 27 28 29 31 32 
1ln lny x∂ ∂ : Mean 0.7932 0.8454 0.7271 0.5832 0.5398 
       % negative 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.41 0.54 
2ln lny x∂ ∂ : Mean 0.2837 0.3120 0.4092 0.6088 0.6378 
       % negative 5.51 0.02 0.00 1.06 0.54 
Curvature Violation (%) 36.23 3.58 0.00 59.89 7.80 
Sector 33 34 35 36 
1ln lny x∂ ∂ : Mean 0.8236 0.8992 0.7967 0.8122 
       % negative 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2ln lny x∂ ∂ : Mean 0.3375 0.2569 0.3068 0.3079 
       % negative 0.00 29.56 0.10 0.06 
Curvature Violation (%) 0.00 51.06 3.50 2.34 
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TABLE D: CONDITIONAL FIXED EFFECTS LOGIT 
  Industry Switching  Firm Exit 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Firm specific variables       
Relative efficiency (weighted) -75.4019** -86.7263** -105.9120** -146.5913** -137.6718** -134.8633**
 (2.06) (2.26) (2.61) (2.18) (2.08) (2.05) 
Firm size (log)  0.1710 0.2075  -0.1325 -0.1514 
  (1.37) (1.61)  (1.22) (1.38) 
State owned enterprise (SOE)  1.5040 1.5396  0.6695 0.6702 
    (1.19) (1.13)   (0.89) (0.89) 
Sector dummies No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 1,787 1,787 1,787 2,558 2,558 2,558 
Groups 695 695 695 1,072 1,072 1,072 
Log Likelihood -640.18 -638.55 -627.17 -907.92 -906.76 -894.06 
LR (p-value) 0.02 0.04 0.07  0.01 0.04 0.01 
Note: Dependent variable: Sector switching (SW2) or firm exit (EXIT). Conditional fixed effects logit estimates. t-values reported in 
parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The total number of sector switchers and exits are 
773 and 1,072 in the unbalanced panel, respectively. 
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TABLE E: COMPARISON BETWEEN INTRA-MANUFACTURING  
AND SERVICE SECTOR SWITCHERS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Firm specific variables       
Relative efficiency (weighted) -44.7841** -45.4567** -6.5822 -6.2422 -0.9871 -1.1072 
 (2.44) (2.44) (0.74) (1.16) (0.12) (0.13) 
Firm size (log)   -0.1186*** -0.1235*** -0.1136*** -0.1196***
   (7.16) (7.18) (6.73) (6.81) 
Firm age (log)   0.0132 0.0139 0.0078 0.0065 
   (0.43) (0.43) (0.25) (0.20) 
State owned enterprise (SOE)     0.0394 0.0788 
     (0.37) (0.72) 
Foreign owned firm (Multinational)     -0.2253*** -0.2330***
     (3.46) (3.53) 
Province dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,076 1,045 1,076 1,045 1,076 1,045 
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.22 
Note: Dependent variable: Switching to the tertiary sector (SER). Pooled probit estimates – marginal effects. All estimations included 
a constant term and time dummies. t-values (reported in parenthesis) are heteroskedasticity robust. *, **, *** indicate significance at a 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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DATA DESCRIPTION 
The data in this paper are drawn from a census of registered enterprises collected by the Vietnamese 
General Statistics Office (GSO) in 2001-2004 covering all 64 provinces. Each firm has a unique tax 
code which enables us to follow the same enterprise over time even if they change location, sector 
or legal ownership type. The census collects detailed data in all production sectors for non-
household enterprises (registered at the province level), including agricultural (primary), 
manufacturing and industry (secondary), and service sector (tertiary) firms.30 Agricultural 
cooperatives and the forestry sector are excluded. However, in this paper we focus exclusively on 
the manufacturing sector (ISIC 15 – ISIC 37). 
 
Enterprises with a business license and a tax code which are not operating and firms which merge 
with another enterprise are excluded. Business units that do not keep independent business records, 
such as branches, are assigned to the enterprise headquarter. If an enterprise is engaged in different 
production activities, the main sector is defined as the one which generates the largest share of total 
gross revenue. The different production activities are documented at the 4-digit ISIC level (6-digit 
in 2004).  
 
The definition of legal ownership form changed between the census years. We use the following 
eleven ownership categories based on the Census information: 1) Central state owned enterprise, 2) 
Local state owned enterprise, 3) Joint stock with state involvement, 4) Cooperative or collective 
company, 5) Private enterprise, 6) Partnership, 7) Private limited liability company, 8) Joint stock 
without State, 9) 100 percent foreign owned enterprise, 10) Joint venture (state owned and foreign 
enterprises), 11) Joint venture (Non-state and foreign enterprises). The share of state/private/foreign 
involvement is not well documented in all census years for categories 3), 10) and 11). Using the 
scarce information on ownership shares available we decided in this paper to classify 1-3 as state 
owned enterprises, 4-8 as private enterprises and 9-11 as enterprises with foreign involvement. The 
                                                 
30 Household establishments (registered at the district level) are a dominant part of the Vietnamese business 
environment (in terms of numbers), but are not covered in this Enterprise Census. According to the 2002 Establishment 
Census (GSO, 2004), enterprises registered at the provincial level (enterprises covered by the data used in this paper) 
accounted for 2.1 percent of all business establishments in 2002, meaning that over 2.5 million household businesses 
are operating in Vietnam. Despite representing a small proportion of the total number of establishments, the enterprises 
covered by the account for most of the registered turnover by Vietnamese establishments (97 percent GSO (2004)). We 
acknowledge that household businesses operate relatively more informally, which will bias the reported turnover 
estimate downwards. Nevertheless, the firms covered in this paper still account for a very large proportion of the total 
production in the Vietnamese economy. 
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ownership variable is therefore an approximation, and we recognize there are “grey” areas 
associated with this classification. 
 
Given that only registered firms under the enterprise law are covered in the GSO data, care should 
be taken when analysing some aspects of firm entry. The questionnaires after 2001 did not collect 
information on establishment year, and given that firms entering in 2002, 2003 or 2004 may have 
existed for several years before registering, doubt exists as to whether or not they constitute entrants 
strictly speaking. Registration may be beneficial to firms (easier access to credit etc.), but it also 
makes firms more visible to government authorities (and especially tax collectors). It is therefore 
uncertain during which stage in their life-cycle a firm decides or is forced to register. Given the 
nature of the data, the present paper focuses on efficiency differentials between incumbents, exits 
and sector switching firms. 
 
All annual censuses provide the information necessary to measure efficiency at the firm-level. We 
use real value added as our output measure, calculated as the sum of gross profits and total labour 
costs, deflated by a GDP-deflator defined at the two-digit sector level. Real capital stock is 
measured as end-period capital stock book value deflated by an aggregate capital deflator and re-
valued by changes in prices of the capital stock. The labour input is measured as total employment 
(only wage or salary receiving employees are included). Total payments to labour include: a) Wage, 
bonus, allowances and other incomes, b) Payments in form of social insurance, c) Other incomes 
those are not accounted in business costs, and d) Contributions of the owner to social insurance, 
health care and trade union. Material inputs include all indirect costs plus raw material costs. 
Material inputs are deflated by a producer price index defined at the two-digit sector level. 
 
